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Combatting money-laundering ranks highly on the political agenda, both 
internationally and in the Netherlands. Much effort has been put into the 
prevention of money laundering, as well as detecting and prosecuting crim-
inals who actually have spent their ill-gotten money in the legal economy. 
Not only has the legal framework been strengthened, e.g. the implementa-
tion of the fourth anti-money laundering directive and fine-tuning of the 
Dutch Penal Code, several financial programs have been introduced in or-
der to strengthen the position of both the police and special investigators 
as well as the public prosecution. In addition, cooperation between the pub-
lic and private sector is encouraged and several informal and formal net-
works combatting money laundering have been established. 
 Anti-money laundering policies are part of the political agenda and 
many resources have been made available – both in terms of public money 
and human capacity. However, it is unknown what the impacts of these 
actions are on money laundering in particular and on crime in general. The 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has recently set-up a framework for 
assessing the effectiveness of anti-money laundering policies. In their 
fourth round of mutual evaluations, this new framework is applied for the 
first time. The mutual evaluation of the Netherlands is planned for 2020. 
In preparation of the coming mutual evaluation, the Dutch Ministry of Jus-
tice commissioned a study to investigate the extent to which the activities 
                                                          




and the actual outcomes of the anti-money laundering policies in the Neth-
erlands comply with the objectives of the anti-money laundering policies 
as formulated by the FATF.2 This chapter highlights the main outcomes of 
this exercise.  
 
 
Anti-money laundering in perspective 
 
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was created in 1989 by the G-73 
with the goal of combatting money laundering as a strategy in the fight 
against drugs. After the attacks on the World Trade Centre in 2001, terror-
ism financing was added to the FATF mandate. In 2008, the FATF scope 
was further extended to the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction.  
 Central to the FATF architecture are the 40 Recommendations, which 
provide international standards on how countries should organise their 
fight against money laundering and terrorist financing, as well as the fi-
nancing of proliferation. Countries shall implement and adapt these stand-
ards to their specific legal and institutional circumstances and characteris-
tics of their financial sector.4  
 The FATF Recommendations refer, amongst others, to establishing 
well-functioning financial intelligence unit, pursuing risk-based policies 
and having an operational sanctioning system. The extent to which a coun-
try has implemented the Recommendations is evaluated via a system of 
regular mutual evaluations, in which, per Recommendation, the evaluators 
                                                          
2  This study is a follow-up of an earlier study that also aimed to assess the state 
of play of the Dutch anti-money laundering system. That study, prepared by 
Decide in 2015, provides information for the period 2010 – 2013 and is seen 
as a snapshot of anti-money laundering policies in that period.  
3  Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United 
States of America. 
4  Implementation of the FATF recommendations in the European Union is reg-
ulated via the EU Anti-Money Laundering Directives of which the first was 
adopted in 1990. The current fourth iteration of the EU Anti-Money Launder-
ing Directive was published on 5 June 2015. The fifth will come into force on 
the 10th January 2020.  
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indicate whether the country is either largely compliant, partially compli-
ant or not compliant at all. To pass the evaluation successfully, countries 
are urged to remedy any biases and strategic deficiencies. 
 The 40 FATF Recommendations primarily focus on the ‘technical’ as-
pects of their anti-money laundering and terrorist financing architecture. It 
concentrates primarily on the question whether countries have the required 
legal and institutional frameworks in place and whether their competent 
authorities have sufficient powers to prevent and fight money laundering, 
terrorism financing and proliferation in an internationally harmonised 
manner.  
 This system of technical compliance only indicates whether certain 
measures, laws and institutions are in place. The system does not provide 
any insights into the effectiveness of the deployed systems. Alternatively, 
the system does not indicate whether less money was laundered, terrorism 
and proliferation were prevented or more criminals were caught as a result 
of the measures.  
 This implies that establishing the right FATF-approved system does not 
automatically imply that money laundering and terrorist financing are ad-
dressed successfully. In a paper on the merits and downsides of the FATF-
approach Halliday et al., (2014) conclude that the FATF has been very 
successful in establishing global standards in anti-money laundering and 
terrorist financing regimes. However, at the same time the FATF is remark-
ably vague and generic in its objectives and how to get there. The FATF 
Recommendations are based on a ‘belief’ that money laundering and the 
financing of terrorism are more likely to be reduced if countries comply 
with the FATF requirements (Halliday et al., 2014).  
 This chapter focuses on the FATF-approach towards money laundering. 
The core question is: to what extent does the FATF provide sufficient guid-





Building upon a successful worldwide implementation of the FATF re-
gime, the FATF realises that the extent to which its overall objectives are 
being achieved is still an open question. In order to address this omission, 
402 
 
and to thereby reach a ‘next level’ of country assessments, the FATF re-
vised its evaluation system in 2012 (FATF, 2012). Next to the 40 technical 
Recommendations, which were reviewed simultaneously, the FATF 
adopted a new system to measure the effectiveness of national anti-money 
laundering.  
 First a ‘high-level objective’ was formulated, which echoes the ‘raison 
d’être’ of the FATF by stating that: “Financial systems and the broader 
economy shall be protected from the threats of money laundering and the 
financing of terrorism and proliferation, thereby strengthening financial 
sector integrity and contributing to safety and security.” 
 This high-level objective still raises many unresolved conceptual ques-
tions, such as the meaning of the term ‘money laundering’, which is not 
unproblematic as legal definitions differ from the colloquial use of the term 
money laundering, and countries also vary in their criminal code defini-
tions of the phenomenon. Secondly, one may still question what is meant 
by the supposed ‘threat of money laundering to the financial system.’ For 
example, Van Duyne and Soudijn, 2013 argue that money of a criminal 
will function no differently in the bank than an account with legally ac-
quired money.5  
 In order to specify the generic high level objective, three ‘intermediate 
outcomes’ and eleven ‘immediate outcomes’ have been formulated. The 
first eight immediate outcomes directly relate to fighting money launder-
ing, while immediate outcomes nine to eleven focus on combatting terror-
ism and proliferation financing (see Figure 1).  
 
  
                                                          
5  As put differently by the authors: the excavated Viking silver hoards in Britain 





FATF Framework for evaluating effectiveness 
 
 
Source: FATF Methodology (2013) 
 
The new FATF effectiveness-assessment methodology was adopted in 
2013 (FATF, 2013). In order to operationalise how effectiveness shall be 
achieved, for each of the immediate outcomes multiple ‘core issues’ were 
formulated. And to strengthen the system even further, the FATF issued a 
guidance document on data requirements in which, per core issue, several 
data suggestions are provided (FATF, 2015).  
 As described above, the FATF developed an extensive Framework for 
evaluating the effectiveness of national anti-money laundering systems. By 
linking the different FATF publications, a concise evaluation framework 
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becomes apparent. Below is an example of one core issue combined with 








Source: FATF (2012, 2013, 2015) 
 
With this new methodology, the FATF’s focus is changing from a predom-
inantly technical evaluation of laws and systems to a more mixed evalua-
tion in which outcomes of anti-money laundering investigations and pros-
ecutions are systematically being assessed. This new approach is applied 
in the fourth round of mutual evaluations that started in 2013. More con-
cretely, each mutual evaluation shall also analyse the actual results (‘out-
comes’) of time and money invested in fighting money laundering. The 
405 
 
question is whether, and to what extent, the new FATF methodology pro-
vides sufficient guidance to do so.  
 
 
Anti-money laundering in the Netherlands 
 
Anti-money laundering policies in the Netherlands have two interrelated 
goals: (i) the prevention and fight against crime, and (ii) the protection of 
the integrity of the financial sector. The Netherlands does not have an over-
all national anti-money laundering policy framework, for example, as it is 
embedded in its national anti-organised crime policies on the one hand, and 
policies aimed at stimulating financial integrity on the other hand. The two 
responsible ministries are the Ministry of Justice (organised crime section) 
and the Ministry of Finance (financial sector integrity).  
 Strictly speaking, this complicates the assessment of the effectiveness 
of the anti-money laundering measures. The successes of anti-money laun-
dering policies strongly depend on how successful a country (the Nether-
lands) is in preventing and fighting crime in general. Similarly, stimulating 
financial integrity is the result of a complex set of rules of conduct and of 
financial surveillance measures, which is much wider than the fight against 
money laundering alone. Anti-money laundering policies cannot, in other 
words, be assessed on their own merits alone. 
 The fourth FATF-evaluation of the Netherlands is scheduled from Oc-
tober to November 2020. In order to start timely preparations of this eval-
uation, and with the objective to gauge its own anti-money laundering pol-
icies on a regular basis, the Ministry of Justice commissioned the develop-
ment of an ‘Anti-money laundering policy monitor’ (Ecorys, 2018). One 
of the specific objectives of this monitor was to explore the application of 
the new FATF-effectiveness assessment to the situation in the Netherlands. 
The monitor covers the years 2014 – 2016.  
 
Methodology of the monitor 
 
The research conducted in the context of this monitor consisted of a com-
prehensive literature review of (Dutch and international) academic litera-
ture and policy documents, the collection and analysis of publicly available 
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quantitative data, and interviews with a large number of relevant stake-
holders from Dutch policymaking and anti-money laundering circles.  
 The monitor’s core unit of measurement is derived from an analysis of 
actors within the anti-money laundering enforcement network in the Neth-
erlands, including: various supervisory agencies, the Financial Intelligence 
Unit (FIU-Nederland), the National Police, the Dutch Fiscal Information 
and Investigation Service (FIOD), the Anti Money Laundering Centre 
(AMLC), the Prosecutors Office and Judiciary, the Central Judicial Debt 
Collection Agency (CJIB), national customs agencies, and the Ministries 
of Justice and Finance. 
 For each actor, a comprehensive overview was prepared, describing 
their role in the anti-money laundering system, their goals, the available 
resources (both in terms of FTE and in terms of financial means), their 
main activities and the results thereof. Where possible, a comparison be-
tween the period 2010 – 2013 and the period 2014 – 2016 was made.  
 Based on these individual analyses, an assessment of the overall Dutch 
anti-money laundering system was made. In this analysis, the FATF frame-
work was tested and for each data suggestion and core issue an indication 






a. from a practical research perspective 
 
Collecting the information required by the FATF is a challenging task, es-
pecially for independent researchers. Over a period of almost two years 
with multiple interviews per actor, phone calls and emails, the amount of 
information collected remained limited. Traditional data, such as the num-
ber of suspicious transaction reports (STRs), the number of convictions, 
and the amount of confiscations can be retrieved rather easily. Neverthe-
less, when more details are required, such as the type of money laundering 
offence,6 the sanction imposed and the number of police investigations, it 
already becomes more difficult.  
                                                          
6  For instance, self-laundering or third party laundering. 
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 On the one hand, actors are reluctant to share information. Some indi-
cated that sharing requested information would be contradictory to the con-
fidentiality of the data (e.g. on administrative sanctions imposed by the 
supervisory agencies), while others did not wish to collaborate with inde-
pendent researchers. On the other hand, much of the data requested by the 
FATF is simply not available within the organisations. For each of the data 
suggestions (FATF, 2015), an assessment was made about which actor 
should have the required information. Several of the actors indicated that 
they do not collect the information requested and in some cases they also 
pointed out that they do not see the relevance of collecting such infor-
mation. It should be noted that the Netherlands is, compared to many other 
countries, well above average in the presentation and analysis of judicial 
data (Levi et al., 2017).  
 Overall, collecting quantitative data to assess the effectiveness is a time 
consuming and difficult task. Much of the requested information is not 
available or actors are not willing to share this. From this practical point of 
view, assessing the effectiveness of the Dutch anti-money laundering sys-
tem turned out to be impossible. Some indications of the results obtained 
could be given, but assessing whether or not the efforts made are effective, 
is still an open-ended question.  
 
b. from a more theoretical perspective 
 
Difficulties with the effectiveness assessment did not only derive from a 
lack of data, as described above. Even when it would have been possible 
to collect all the required data, an analysis of the effectiveness of the anti-
money laundering system would have remained a methodological obstacle. 
Several, more essential problems, will remain and need to be addressed, 
namely: 
▪ There is no credible methodology for measuring the total amounts of 
money laundered; 
▪ The FATF overlooks the need for constructing a proper baseline or zero 
measurement; 
▪ Data, as suggested by the FATF, allow different and even contradictory 
conclusions; 
▪ Prevention is not sufficiently delineated by the new FATF-methodol-
ogy, which renders it unmeasurable; 
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▪ The FATF implicitly assumes a predominantly criminal law approach 
to money laundering.  
 
In the following paragraphs, examples are presented to illustrate the above 
stated points. This is based on the earlier mentioned study for the Dutch 
Ministry of Justice (Ecorys, 2018).  
 First, quantification of the outcomes (effectiveness) is problematic as 
long as it remains unknown how much money is actually being laundered. 
Despite several attempts to assess the size of the money laundering, no 
unequivocal methodology for measuring money laundering has been pro-
vided thus far. Attempts to quantify the total amount of money laundered 
– see for example Tanzi (1996), Schneider (2004, 2015) Unger (2006, 
2018), Soudijn (2012) – are based on numerous assumptions and econo-
metric modelling, which create much discussion, both within academia and 
among policymakers. These estimates are too uncertain for assessing the 
effectiveness of anti-money laundering policies over the years.  
 None of the methods is based on the extrapolation of prosecution data 
and for good reasons. First prosecution data are not useful in assessing the 
amounts of money laundered. One of the problems with prosecution data 
is that the prosecutor can by default impose money laundering for any 
crime-for-profit. Public prosecutors do not always follow this route, be-
cause (i) the extra burden of proof needed for a money laundering charge 
has no added value in terms of sentencing; (ii) charging money-laundering 
offences might unnecessarily reasons slow down the trail efficiency and 
(iii) the proceeds of crime may be reclaimed with demanding a court re-
covery order or sentence. 
 Second, to assess the effectiveness of anti-money laundering measures 
a baseline is required. Such a baseline is not part of the current FATF meth-
odology, while a baseline is a critical reference point for assessing the 
changes due to anti-money laundering activities and for understanding the 
effectiveness of an anti-money laundering regime. The current fourth 
round of mutual evaluations should explicitly have aimed to provide a 
baseline for future effectiveness assessments. Strictly speaking, without a 
baseline no proper judgements on the effectiveness can be made. The 
FATF seems to have overlooked this. 
 Third, the FATF presents numerous data suggestions to substantiate the 
immediate outcomes (FATF, 2015). In its guidance, the FATF indicates 
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that an assessment of the effectiveness should be beyond a purely statistical 
exercise. Assessors should use data and statistics, as well as other qualita-
tive information, when reaching an informed judgement about how well an 
outcome is being achieved. Data should be ‘interpreted critically’ and 
placed in the context of a country’s circumstances. This is another core 
problem of the new methodology. The suggested approach appears to be 
based on ‘hard data’, but in the end, the interpretation is fully qualitative 
and subjective. This is in line with a general contemporary critique in social 
sciences on the tendency to overvalue statistics and to undervalue the va-
lidity thereof (Levi et al., 2017). 
 In addition, country reports of the fourth round of mutual FATF evalu-
ations conducted thus far, reveal a remarkable lack of data. Also a variation 
between countries in types of data presented, and in the levels of detail 
thereof, became apparent. A short analysis of a selection country reports7 
shows that:  
▪ None of the countries presented data in the context of Immediate Out-
come (IO) 1 (anti-money laundering policy framework). 
▪ The narratives of IO 6, 7 and 8 (detection, prosecution and sanctioning 
respectively) are most data rich.  
▪ Data are being used multiple times to explain more than one IO. 
▪ Assessments of IO 3 (supervisors) highly depend on the internal data 
made available by specific supervisors, while there is wide variation 
across countries on how supervision is organised, which complicates 
cross-country comparisons. 
▪ The level of detail between the presented data differs substantially 
across countries and across types of data. Nevertheless, more detailed 
data do not automatically lead to a higher evaluation result.8  
▪ There is no proper validity test of the presented data, which makes them 
questionable for evaluation purposes.  
 The availability of data as suggested by the FATF-methodology is also 
                                                          
7  In the context of the study for the Ministry of Justice, the following country 
reports were analysed: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Hungary, Italy, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and USA. 
8  During a mutual FATF evaluation, all immediate outcomes are assessed. Based 
on the assessment, the country receives per immediate outcome an effective-
ness mark, e.g. low, moderate or substantial level of effectiveness’. The assess-
ment is based on both quantitative and mainly qualitative information. How 
these are combined remains undeterminated. 
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a problem in the Netherlands. Two years before the fourth mutual evalua-
tion of the Netherlands, much of the data, as suggested in the FATF-as-
sessment methodology, were not (yet) available.  
 A more pressing pitfall is that the data may tell different and even op-
posing stories. For instance, what does a high number of money laundering 
cases prosecuted (core issue 7,3) mean? Is this an indication that money 
laundering is actively and successfully detected, investigated and prose-
cuted? Or is the underlying problem so large, that in practice the efforts 
made are only a drop in the ocean? Reversing this argument, does a low 
number of money laundering cases mean that crime is not actively detected 
and prosecuted? Or is the problem simply of a limited dimension? Or is 
there an successful level of prevention? 
 Another example concerns the implicit message in many of the FATF 
evaluations is that a high number of STRs or an increase in the number of 
STRs is considered as a sign of a good or better functioning anti-money 
laundering system. However, an increase in STRs may reflect several de-
velopments. It may point at enhanced FATF-compliance, as more cases of 
suspected money laundering are reported to the authorities. It could also be 
the result of an increase in underlying money laundering activities. 
Changes in the numbers of STRs may also simply result from a change in 
anti-money laundering regulations, for instance when new reporting enti-
ties are brought under the anti-money laundering regulations. This illus-
trates that a good understanding of the context is crucial to draw conclu-
sions on the real-world meaning of the data.    
 In addition, the number of money laundering cases detected, investi-
gated, prosecuted or money laundering convictions does not take into ac-
count the size, nature and complexity of the cases. As an example, Figure 
2 presents the number of money laundering cases prosecuted in the Neth-
erlands in the period 2010 to 2016. The data reveal a decrease between 
2012 and 2015. What does this mean? Was the Dutch public prosecution 
doing less well? Without any additional information, the question cannot 
be answered unambiguously. It is possible, that the public prosecution fo-
cused on several larger and more complicated cases. Successful prosecu-
tion of such complex cases may yield better results in terms of discourag-
ing money laundering practices than prosecuting multiple smaller cases 
such as the many cases of ‘self-laundering’: the small fry that feeds the 
statistics. Nevertheless, the FATF data suggestions seem to favour a high 
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number of cases prosecuted above the prosecution of a more limited num-
ber of large and complex cases. A deliberate focus on the latter, might in 
an evaluation falsely be labelled as a less effective policy.  
 
Figure 3  
Number of money laundering cases prosecuted  
 
Source: Ecorys (2018) 
 
Fourth, assessing prevention is problematic. Prevention is an important pil-
lar under anti-money laundering policies and practices. The second inter-
mediate outcome explicitly refers to prevention, by stating that proceeds of 
crime shall be prevented from entering the financial and other sectors. Pre-
vention is explicitly referred to in immediate outcome 4 according to which 
financial institutions and other economic entities have to apply adequate 
anti-money laundering preventive measures. Immediate outcome 5 also re-
fers to the prevention of misuse for money laundering.  
 As an illustration, stakeholders in the Netherlands claim that the focus 
in the fight against money laundering is shifting towards an increase in 
activities aimed at prevention. Many of the stakeholders interviewed in the 
context of this study indicated that more time and resources have been de-
voted to make the Netherlands an unattractive country for money launder-
ing. Nevertheless, it is difficult to support these statements, as determining 
the impact of these efforts is difficult, especially in a quantitative way.9 
                                                          
9  Evaluating crime prevention is a developed area of research within criminol-
ogy. A variety of different approaches to measures crime prevention outcomes 
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The FATF itself hardly provides any guidance on this issue, as the most 
elaborated core issues still focus on detecting and prosecuting money laun-
dering activities, and not on preventing it. Based on the information col-
lected in the Netherlands, it is not possible to indicate how much money 
laundering was prevented, which share of it directly relates to anti-money 
laundering policies and how much is caused by external factors measured 
from a determined point in time. Again, a prevention assessment without a 
baseline (zero-measurement) is void. 
 Connected to the above argument is the fact that money-laundering ac-
tivities might change and thereby slip off the detection radar. For example, 
the methods to launder the money might change to a yet unknown area for 
the relevant authorities or, more importantly, money-laundering activities 
might move to other countries, with less stringent regimes. Increasing na-
tional efforts to combat money-laundering lead to an increased pressure on 
the systems of other (often neighbouring) countries. As a result, interna-
tional cross-border cooperation becomes more important in the fight 
against crime. Although many stakeholders, including the European Com-
mission and the FATF, recognise the importance of cross-border coopera-
tion, reality shows that international cooperation remains a struggle.  
 Finally, the FATF-methodology for assessing the effectiveness of anti-
money laundering policies implicitly assumes a predominant criminal law 
approach. Although the FATF indicates that, the data suggestions are not 
exhaustive and not mandatory, the new evaluation system still has a crim-
inal law bias. There are no data suggestions on alternative repressive ap-
proaches, which in fact might be highly effective. For example, a multitude 
of sanctions can be taken against perpetrators of money laundering, making 
use of instruments available under criminal law, administrative law, fiscal 
law and disciplinary law. In the different areas, fines can be imposed and 
the values of those fines can be combined. However, in administrative law 
also other sanctions might be imposed, such as the revoking of licenses. 
These measures might be more effective in combatting money laundering 
than imposing fines. Nonetheless, they are easily forgotten in the effective-
ness assessment, as it is easier to count convictions or euros confiscated 
                                                          
have been developed, including experimental research designs, qualitative re-
search, participatory evaluations and theory driven approaches (see Morgan 
and Homel, 2013). These methods could potentially enrich the FATF approach 
to measure the preventive effectiveness of the anti-money laundering regime. 
413 
 





The FATF has been successful in establishing global standards in anti-
money laundering laws, institutions and polices. Since 2012, the FATF 
evaluation system not only focuses on technical compliance to the FATF 
standards but also on the effectiveness of the deployed systems. This new 
approach is currently implemented in the fourth round of mutual evalua-
tions.  
 Despite these valid intentions, the application of the new FATF evalu-
ations evaluation framework to real world anti-money laundering activities 
raises many questions.  
 Assessing the impact of anti-money laundering policies is by definition 
a challenge as there is no methodology for measuring the size of the un-
derlying problem (the amounts of money that are actually being laundered 
in a country).  
 Besides this core problem, two aspects of the new methodology should 
be addressed in order to further improve the effectiveness assessment 
method. One the one hand, the FATF data suggestions centre around tra-
ditional – and relatively easy-to-get – data, such as numbers of suspicious 
transaction reports, money laundering investigations and prosecutions. 
These data may be interpreted in contradictory directions. For example, an 
increase in STRs may be the result of both enhanced and weaker anti-
money laundering policies, and of an increase of the underlying problem. 
The conclusion is that ‘hard data’ become soft, as a qualitative and some-
times subjective interpretation is needed. Moreover, anti-money launder-
ing policies and practices are changing rapidly in some countries, such as 
the Netherlands, where a traditional judicial approach to money laundering 
is replaced by a combination of penal, fiscal and administrative instru-
ments. This should be better addressed in the FATF evaluation framework.  
 On the other hand, several methodological challenges are open to be 
addressed in the future. First of all, as prevention is crucial in the interna-
tional anti-money laundering regime a credible method for assessing the 
preventive impacts would be greatly enhance the effectiveness assessment 
framework. Also, the FATF should develop guidance on validation of the 
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presented data. In addition, the FATF effectiveness assessment would be-
come more credible with the explicit introduction of a baseline assessment. 
 In order to address the current weaknesses in the FATF evaluation 
methodology, the FATF should appoint a panel of independent academic 
experts and assign them with the task to address current data and method-
ological shortcomings. The current FATF system of a high-level objective, 
intermediate outcomes and immediate outcomes is predominantly the re-
sult of international negotiations, rather than strict analytical thinking. This 
is the fundamental shortcoming of the current methodology. The interpre-
tation of the evaluation outcomes may be subject to politics while evalua-
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